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TS-204930-73

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

ATTENTION:

SUBJECT: Key Intelligence Questions for FY 1974

REFERENCE: DDI memorandum of 2 November 1973, same subject.

The attached DD/S&T comments are forwarded herewith in
accordance with the reference.

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Donald H. Steininger
Associate Deputy Director
for
Science and Technology

Attachment:
Comments on "Key Intelligence
Questions for FY 1974"

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TS-204930-73

SUBJECT: Key Intelligence Questions for FY 1974

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DDS&T/EA/[REDACTED] 19 November 1973)

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Attachment:
TS-204930-73

DD/S&T Comments on "Key Intelligence Questions for FY 1974"

Page 1 -

1. Soviet Political Dynamics

Add: The USSR's capability to provide continued military aid to third-world countries and still satisfy its own national security needs.

2. Soviet ICBM Systems

Add: The effectiveness with which Soviet ICBM forces can accomplish their intended missions (such a question reflects some of our NTA effort).

Page 2 -

3. Soviet Nuclear Weapons

Delete: Impact of termination of underground testing (e.g., a comprehensive test ban) on development and deployment of Soviet nuclear warheads.

Comment: We know of no unusual pressure for a CTB that requires an answer to this question in FY 74, though it may be a legitimate question for long range planning.

4. Soviet Long Range Aviation

Add: Soviet development of air-launched stand-off weapons, particularly for the Backfire.

5. Soviet Naval Systems

Add: Soviet efforts and progress in improving the command and control of their SSBN/SLBM forces.

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Page 2

Page 3 -

7. Soviet Strategic Defensive Systems

Change second entry to read -

Soviet development of aircraft weapon systems with improved capability to intercept low altitude aircraft (maybe Soviets will do it another way rather than look down/shoot down).

Add: Soviet capabilities to use mobile tactical SAMs to fill gap in low altitude strategic air defense.

- Soviet development of laser weapons. Amend to read:
Soviet development of laser weapons for both target kill and non-kill, such as discrimination

Add: Soviet efforts and progress in advanced early warning--OTH and space-based techniques.

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Page 10 -

Although the Narcotics Section does not address specific drugs, the thrust of the questions seems directed at opium and its derivatives to the exclusion of cocaine, and the South American problem is omitted. The following suggested changes to the Narcotics Section have been coordinated with NARCOG and the Intelligence Directorate:

- a. South America should be represented in the country list.
- b. Change heading from Narcotics Traffic to Narcotics Production and Traffic.
- c. Delete the word "prosecution" in the first item.
- d. Add as a fourth item "identification and location of poppy and cocoa-growing areas."

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Attachment:
TS-204930-73
Page 3

These changes would result in a modification of page 10 of the subject paper as shown:

NARCOTICS

The intelligence community is particularly concerned with the capabilities and intentions

in dealing with narcotics problems.

The key questions concern:

1. Narcotics Production and Traffic

- Identification of the major narcotics producers/traffickers and their principal collaborators; their vulnerabilities and means of exposing and disrupting their networks.
- Location of their laboratories and storage facilities.
- Methods, routes, and timing of the movement of narcotics destined for the United States.
- Identification and location of poppy and cocoa-growing areas.

It is suggested that the following additional miscellaneous topic be added to the list of key questions:

Nuclear Proliferation

- The intentions and activities relating to the development of nuclear weapon capabilities.

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DD/S&T# 3445-73

2 November 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution Below

SUBJECT : Key Intelligence Questions for
FY 1974

1. The DDCI has assigned action to Mr. Proctor to prepare the CIA comment on the Key Intelligence Questions for FY 1974. Attached are those questions and the DCI's covering memo.

2. Please review those "key questions" that are pertinent to the mission of your component. Most of you have already had the opportunity to comment on earlier drafts of these "key questions." Nevertheless, we should go through this exercise once more to correct any major sins of omission or commission.

3. Please provide your comments to me no later than COB Thursday, 15 November.




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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE TS 205229/73/1
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505 Copy 8 of 50 Copies

30 October 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Security Council
Intelligence Committee

BDI-4720-73

SUBJECT: Key Intelligence Questions for FY 1974

1. Attached is my list of priority national intelligence subjects and related key intelligence questions for FY 1974. This list represents those substantive matters which I consider to be of greatest importance to the top level consumers of national intelligence.

2. I intend to use this listing, as amended by any comments NSCIC members may make, as a basis for tasking the collection and analytical assets of the intelligence community during the remainder of FY 1974. The results will be used as a major indicator in assessing the performance of the intelligence community during the balance of the fiscal year. It is therefore important that the subjects and questions be truly responsive to the important needs of the NSC. I request, therefore, that NSCIC members, in reviewing this package and forming any comments, base their judgments on their needs as consumers of intelligence.

3. I intend to provide the USIB agencies with specific guidelines as to how the responses to the key intelligence questions will be framed. Each response will have five parts:

First, inclusion of the subject in regular agency collection and analytical work on a priority basis, the results appearing in regular production output;

Second, a brief summation of important community judgments on the topic as contained in recent intelligence publications, with a highlighting of agreements and disagreements and the uncertainties underlying the judgments;

Third, an identification of important collection or analytical gaps;

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
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Fourth, a proposed collection and analytical strategy to fill the gaps, in specified time frames;

Fifth, a recapitulation and evaluation after FY 1974 of the performance of the community and the individual agencies in responding to these subjects and questions. The conclusions therefrom will be included in the resource allocation and evaluation process at the time of my National Intelligence Program Recommendations to the President in November 1974.

4. It will be obvious that the questions do not encompass the entire spectrum of intelligence needs. Some matters of continuing importance (e.g., strategic warning of hostilities involving the United States) are not included in this listing. These will be reflected in the comprehensive listing of U.S. Foreign Intelligence Priorities in DCID 1/2 currently being considered by the USIB. The purpose of the attachment is rather to identify the subjects on which intelligence inputs are now or shortly will become of highest interest to policy levels of our government. It is an attempt to anticipate the needs of policymakers. The focus is entirely on the world environment during the balance of this fiscal year. Our longer range interests, and the improvement of intelligence capabilities to cope with such, are separate even though related matters.

5. I would appreciate receiving by 22 November comments concerning the key questions and any additions, deletions, or re-wording you consider would improve the listing.


W. E. Colby

Attachment
TS 205229/73, Cy

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KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS FOR FY 1974

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

U.S. collection and analytical efforts against Soviet strategic capabilities must focus on the early phases of Soviet military R&D and on Soviet planning. At issue is the degree of progress the Soviets intend to make within the constraints of the SAL agreements, and whether they intend to comply with them. Soviet perceptions of the U.S. as a strategic competitor will help to shape Soviet decisions in this area.

The challenge to the intelligence community in supporting MBFR negotiations will be more difficult in some ways than it has been for the SAL agreements. Important elements of the Warsaw Pact's capability to fight nuclear and conventional war in Europe are imprecisely known, and changes in force and equipment levels will be difficult to monitor.

On the political level, the intelligence community must concentrate on several aspects of Soviet domestic and foreign policies. For the next year the key intelligence questions will be:

1. Soviet Political Dynamics

- Factions, factors and policy differences in Soviet decision-making circles
- Soviet and Warsaw Pact strategic planning for political, economic and military conflict with the U.S. and Europe
- Soviet strategic planning for and consideration of Sino-Soviet relations

2. Soviet ICBM Systems

- The types and characteristics of MIRVed ICBMs the Soviets intend to develop and deploy
- Soviet progress in development of a mobile ICBM
- Soviet efforts and progress in improving the accuracy of their ICBM forces
- Soviet efforts and objectives in improving the survivability of their ICBM forces

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3. Soviet Nuclear Weapons

- Identification of tactical nuclear weapons in land, sea, and air forces
- Identification and location of nuclear weapons storage depots in Eastern Europe
- Impact of termination of underground testing (e.g., a comprehensive test ban) on development and deployment of Soviet nuclear warheads

4. Soviet Long Range Aviation

- Size and intended role of the Backfire force
- Soviet development of a follow-on heavy bomber

5. Soviet Naval Systems

- Soviet plans and progress toward the deployment of a full inventory of DELTA/SS-N-8 submarines, or follow-on SSBN/SLBM system
- Soviet R&D and deployment of cruise/missile systems, particularly follow-on submarine-launched systems
- Soviet R&D and deployment of advanced ASW systems
- Soviet plans for the role of their aircraft carrier and the number and rate of construction

6. Warsaw Pact - NATO Balance

- Evaluation of Warsaw Pact strengths and weaknesses, including an assessment of ground forces' combat effectiveness
- Soviet criteria for establishing adequacy of forces for military and political security
- Soviet views of major East-West military asymmetries and of ways to resolve them

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- Soviet capabilities for rapid deployment of forces from the USSR to Central Europe

7. Soviet Strategic Defensive Systems

- Soviet progress in ABM development--attitudes toward or plans for further ABM deployment
- Soviet development of look down/shoot down capability for interceptor aircraft
- Soviet development of laser weapons

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THE PRC

China's intentions depend greatly on the character of the post-Mao leadership. The Chinese may have already achieved an effective nuclear deterrent against the USSR and are working on a missile system which would provide a nuclear capability against the United States. These achievements imply major qualitative changes in China's strategic relationship with the two superpowers and with the Third World. The key intelligence questions concern:

1. Status of Sino-Soviet Relations

- Indications that the Chinese leadership has found Soviet pressure so great as to modify its present policies toward the USSR
- Capabilities of the forces along the border and how they are changing

2. Possible Changes in PRC Policy and/or Political and Military Leadership

- Indications and significance of possible strains among the present PRC leadership
- Identification of the leading candidates to succeed the present leadership, and their foreign policy/economic/military views

3. Chinese Intentions and Progress Toward Leadership of the Third World

4. PRC Strategic Offensive Forces

- The specific characteristics of land-based missile systems with special reference to ranges, vulnerability, reliability, accuracies, reaction times, and targeting sectors
- Location of missile units and launch sites
- The characteristics and performance data of intended SLBM(s)

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- The status of production and deployment of the SSBN

5. PRC Nuclear Weapons Program

- The direction of the R&D effort
- The number and type of warheads, rate of production, and location of stockpiles
- Location and capacity of new facilities for the production of fissionable material

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LATIN AMERICA

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The improvement of our understanding of Latin American political dynamics and their effect on U.S. interests is of high importance during FY 74.

[Redacted]

In the coming year the key intelligence questions will be:

1.

[Redacted]

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2. Cuban Policies and Programs

- Cuban internal weaknesses
- Cuban subversion in Latin America

3.

[Redacted]

4. Inter-American Regional Organization

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- Alignments likely to develop [Redacted] over specific issues

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5. Capabilities and Intentions of Terrorist Groups

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SOUTHEAST ASIA

The challenge of ongoing insurgencies or the threat of latent insurgent movements is being faced by all Southeast Asia nations. The defeat of local governments, particularly those of South Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines, could have serious impact upon U.S. interests. In the coming year, the key intelligence questions will concern:

1. Political and Military Prospects

- Intentions of North Vietnamese or other Communist forces concerning major military action in Indochina during FY 74
- Signs of any significant erosion in the position of the Saigon government

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NEAR EAST AND PERSIAN GULF

The political and military stability of the region is of primary importance to the development of U.S. interests in the near term.

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reducing the vulnerability of the region to Soviet influence. The key intelligence questions for FY 74 are:

1. Arab-Israeli Conflict

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5. Terrorism

- Viability of major terrorist groups in region
- Relationships of these groups with other terrorist groups and with local governments

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
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2. Yugoslavia

- Likelihood of major internal changes in near term
- Trends in foreign policies, especially toward USSR

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NARCOTICS

The intelligence community is particularly concerned with the capabilities and intentions of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] dealing with narcotics problems. The key questions concern:

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1. Narcotics Traffic

- Identification of the major narcotics producers/traffickers and their principal collaborators; their vulnerabilities to prosecution, exposure and disruption of their networks
- Location of their laboratories and storage facilities
- Methods, routes and timing of the movement of narcotics destined for the United States

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ECONOMICS

A. Economic Developments Affecting U.S. National Security.
U.S. dependence on other countries' mineral resources, especially petroleum, is rapidly increasing. Incomes of oil-producing states are rising, and their ability to exert pressure on the U.S. and other Western powers by controlling oil supplies is mounting. There is, however, a rising world demand for U.S. grains and oilseeds. Moreover, the Soviet Union is seeking to make up for deficiencies in its economy; in so doing it is engaging in increased economic exchanges with the United States. The key questions related to the foregoing are:

1. The Oil Problem

- Changes which are likely to occur in oil producers' policies or negotiating positions that may affect the output, export, or price of oil
- Prospective major long- or short-term deals being negotiated between the OECD countries, [REDACTED] with the oil-producing countries
- The degree of involvement of the Soviet Union in Middle East oil matters

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2. Soviet Economic Capabilities and Vulnerabilities

- The extent to which the USSR can cover its requirements for grain, oilseeds, and sugar from domestic production in the 1974 crop year
- Soviet needs for imported technology to sustain economic growth and successes in obtaining that technology

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- Size and economic potential of USSR's mineral and petroleum deposits, especially the extent of the "proved" reserves at Tyumen and Yakutsk, and Soviet efforts, if any, to play off [] and Washington re development of their fossil fuels.


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- The effect of the USSR's balance-of-payments position on its ability to trade with the West
- Constraints placed on economic policy by military programs

3. Worldwide Crop Prospects

- Information required for making forecasts of output of key food grains, feed grains, and meals--especially wheat, corn, rice, and soybeans

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Key Intelligence Questions for FY 1974:

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